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Abstract
Members of extreme political groups are usually perceived as more homogeneous than moderates. We investigated whether
members of the general public who share the same political ideology would exhibit different levels of heterogeneity in terms of
human values across 20 European countries and Israel. We directly compared the variability across moderate-, left-, and right-
wing groups. Our findings suggest that the values of more extreme (left-wing or right-wing) supporters are usually more het-
erogeneous than those with more moderate views. We replicated this finding for politics-related variables such as attitudes toward
immigrants and trust in (inter)national institutions. We also found that country-level variables (income, religiosity, and parasite
stress level) did not moderate the pattern of value variability. Overall, our results suggest that endorsing the same political
ideology is not necessarily associated with sharing the same values, especially in the case of common citizens holding extreme
political attitudes.
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Human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and
respect for human rights: these are the core values of the EU.
—European Union. (n.d.)
As noted in the quote above, shared core values are considered
to be fundamental to the European Union (EU). However,
while these core values are endorsed by most people across all
European countries on average (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), it
has been found that within-country value variability is substan-
tial (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011), suggesting that the values are
not endorsed by everyone equally. In the present research, we
extend this line of inquiry in a novel way by investigating
whether two groups that are usually perceived as homoge-
neous, extreme political left- and right-wing supporters, are
indeed homogeneous with respect to their core values.
While values have been found to significantly predict iden-
tification with ideological groups and voting behavior (Barnea
& Schwartz, 1998; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, &
Barbaranelli, 2006; Schwartz, 1996), we are aware of no stud-
ies that have directly explored within- and between-country
value variability in the context of nonpolitically active individ-
uals residing in European countries. In considering value varia-
bility in the political context, we believe that it is important to
study values differences among the general public, not only
those of elected politicians or active party members. This is
because heterogeneity within active political party members
might be underestimated, a result of group processes that tend
to increase perceived homogeneity among group members (see
Mason, 2006). We propose that value differences are derived
from country membership, which in turn is associated with a
range of variables, such as historical context, religious denomina-
tions, or income (Fischer, 2017; van Herk & Poortinga, 2012;
Welzel, 2013).
There is a popular belief that individuals within political
left- and right-wing extremist groups share very similar values
and attitudes in contrast to more moderate activists who are
seen as more heterogeneous. Likewise, some even argue that
all extremists, across the political left and right, in fact, support
similar policies, in a view known as “horseshoe theory” (see
Choat, 2017). However, not only do recent studies fail to sup-
port such beliefs, they also contradict them. For example, van
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Hiel (2012) analyzed variability in values and anti-immigration
attitudes among political party activists who reported affilia-
tion with left-, right-wing, and moderate groups. Analyzing
European Social Survey data (2002–2008) collected from
Western European political activists, van Hiel found a substan-
tial amount of heterogeneity of values within left- and right-
wing party members, and greater homogeneity reported among
members with moderate views. However, he did not directly
compare the variability across groups of individuals who iden-
tified themselves with the political left, right, or center. Van
Hiel also found that left-wing respondents reported signifi-
cantly lower endorsement of values associated with conserva-
tion, self-enhancement, and anti-immigration attitudes
compared to both moderate and right-wing activists, with indi-
viduals on the right reporting greater endorsement of such val-
ues and attitudes. In a subsequent study, he corroborated the
above findings for values and ethnic prejudice for Belgian acti-
vists. Overall, van Hiel (2012) provided evidence demonstrat-
ing that Western European extremist groups are far from being
homogenous and left- and right-wing groups represent distinct
ideologies.
However, one limitation of van Hiel’s (2012) article is that
he focused on value variability only among political activists
from Western European states (Study 1) and Belgium (Study
2). Further, as noted above, he did not directly compare the
variability across groups of individuals that identified them-
selves with the political left-, right-wing, or center. Therefore,
in the current article, we extended van Hiel’s research ques-
tions by exploring whether value endorsement and sociopoliti-
cal attitudes differ more among extreme political supporters
than moderates (not limited to political activists) and how
much of such variability can be explained by country member-
ship within the European context across 20 European states and
Israel, separately for each of the three groups.
Generally, in terms of between-country differences in val-
ues, Fischer and Schwartz (2011) found that across 66 coun-
tries, values vary most between individuals, with smaller
differences between countries. However, specific to the Eur-
opean context, a study by Schwartz and Bardi (1997) on values
within Eastern versus Western European countries revealed
substantial differences in value priorities. Specifically, citizens
of countries that were more deeply penetrated by the commu-
nist regime were more likely to adopt values associated with
such ideology. That is, they endorsed conservatism, confor-
mity, and had lower interpersonal trust in comparison to people
in Western countries.
In a later study on cross-country value differences in the
context of politics, Duriez, van Hiel, and Kossowska (2005)
explored value endorsement among politically interested sup-
porters and found stronger evidence of variability across two
European countries—Poland and Belgium. They studied the
relationship between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and
social dominance orientation (SDO). RWA is usually related
to openness to change and conservation values,¼while SDO
is linked to self-enhancement and self-transcendence values
(Duckitt, 2001). As both RWA and SDO correspond to the
right-wing ideology (Altemeyer, 1998), such personality
dimensions should be positively correlated. Indeed, a signifi-
cant positive relationship between RWA and SDO was
detected among Belgian participants (r ¼ .24). Yet the same
was not true for the Polish participants (r ¼ .03), indicating
that having authoritarian values did not predict preferences for
a social structure based on inequality. Aside from between-
country differences, Duriez et al. (2005) reported intracultural
variability in the RWA-SDO relationship, which depended on
the degree of people’s political involvement, such that greater
involvement was linked with a more pronounced relation
between RWA and SDO. Duriez et al. (2005) suggested that
within Western European countries (e.g., Belgium), political
groups were historically positioned on the left–right dimension,
with neither side being dominant. However, in Eastern Eur-
opean countries (e.g., Poland), there was substantial asymmetry
in the dominance of different political groups (e.g., strong dom-
inance of the socialist left or conservative right); therefore, the
left-right dimension might capture different values in Eastern
countries than in Western ones. This implies that left- and
right-wing ideologies may have different meanings on account
of variability in the sociopolitical and historical context (see
Piurko, Schwartz, & Davidov, 2011) corroborating Schwartz
and Bardi’s (1997) findings.
However, value and attitude variability at a supranational
level (i.e., relevant to our article, as we investigate 21 coun-
tries) might differ when compared to variability studied at a
small-scale level, for example, when considering local activist
political groups. Indeed, Ondish and Stern (2017) studied in-
group consensus levels among U.S.-American liberals, conser-
vatives, and moderates in the context of political attitudes (e.g.,
welfare, gun control). They reported that although conserva-
tives were relatively cohesive in terms of political attitudes in
local/self-selected network groups, they were more heteroge-
neous than liberals when their opinions were investigated at a
national level. Indeed, more consensus on a local level has been
found to be related to less cohesion on a broader (national)
scale (Newson, Richerson, & Boyd, 2007). Interestingly, there
was more in-group consensus among conservatives and liberals
than moderates. Taken together, such results provide an argu-
ment that endorsing the same ideology might not necessary
lead to sharing similar attitudes at a broader level. Also, having
moderate views is not always associated with greater homoge-
neity, especially in the U.S.-American context and political
attitudes, which contradicts findings obtained in the European
context (Duriez et al., 2005; van Hiel, 2012).
Altogether, it appears that extreme political activists, politi-
cians, and political supporters in Europe demonstrate more
variability in terms of attitudes and values than moderates
(Duriez et al., 2005; van Hiel, 2012). Yet such findings are
based on studies that investigated limited and specific Eur-
opean contexts, such as using solely activists from Western
European countries (van Hiel, 2012) or comparing two Eur-
opean countries (Belgium and Poland; Duriez et al., 2005). The
only study that examined attitude variability at a broader level
among general population was confined to the United States
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(Ondish & Stern, 2017), which is not necessarily applicable to
Europe. Therefore, in the present study, we investigated how
much value and attitude variability country membership
explains within left-/right-wing and moderate supporters and
which of the three groups is most homogeneous within and
across countries.
The Present Research
We propose that the high-value heterogeneity found in groups
endorsing more extreme ideologies, as found by van Hiel
(2012) within activist groups, and Duriez et al. (2005) within
both activist and supporter groups, will exist among citizens
from a wide range of European countries. Such heterogeneity
could be partly explained by country membership. We predict
a higher proportion of variance in value endorsement to be
explained by country membership among more extreme polit-
ical supporters compared to individuals with moderate views.
Further, as pointed out by Duriez et al. (2005), understanding
of the left-/right-wing political principles varies across coun-
tries within Europe (also see Piurko et al., 2011). Hence, it is
likely that left-/right-wing politicians and political supporters
understand the meaning of ideologies and their underlying val-
ues differently as a consequence of cross-country variability.
We used data from the most recent European Social Survey
(2014–2015). The survey measured all value types and political
attitudes on the left-/right-wing political spectrum in the gen-
eral population. We selected 20 European countries and Israel
within the survey, and we divided the survey participants into
three ideological groups according to their self-reported polit-
ical attitude (extreme left, extreme right, and center). As noted
earlier, the left-right dimension might have different meanings
across different countries; however, we suggest that such varia-
bility is underpinned by differences in value endorsement
(Piurko et al., 2011), which is the focus of our investigation.
Based on the reviewed literature (Duriez et al., 2005;
Fischer & Schwartz, 2011; Ondish & Stern 2017; van Hiel,
2012), we hypothesized that country membership would
explain more variance in endorsement of values within sup-
porters of political extremes (left- and right-wing) than those
with more moderate political views. We also predicted a lower
level of within-country value agreement in the case of more
politically extreme individuals compared to individuals in the
political center. Finally, based on Fischer and Schwartz
(2011), we expected that country membership would explain
less than 15% of the variance overall, as European countries are
less culturally diverse.
In addition, we tested whether extreme left- and right polit-
ical supporters are more heterogeneous across other politics-
related variables that are linked to values: attitudes toward
immigrants and trust in (inter)national institutions than those
in the center. For exploratory purposes, we also included
well-being. This is to explore whether the findings from values
also hold for other important psychological constructs (atti-
tudes and well-being). We expected a similar pattern of results
as in the case of values.1
Method
Participants
The sample was representative and contained 40,185 partici-
pants (53.0% female) from 20 European countries and Israel.
The mean age of the sample was 49.28 years (SD ¼ 18.74,
range¼ 14–114). The 21 countries are Austria, Belgium, Swit-
zerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain,
Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, and the
United Kingdom. The data were collected in 2014 and 2015
and were obtained from the European Social Survey (seventh
round; http://europeansocialsurvey.org/).
Materials and Procedure
To measure the 10 value types of Schwartz’s (1992) model of
values, we used all 21 items of the short Portrait Value Ques-
tionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz et al., 2001). Using a scale from 1
(very much like me) to 6 (not like me at all), participants indi-
cated how similar they were to a fictitious person who shows a
positive attitude toward a prototypical behavior for 1 of the 10
value types. Sample items include: “Thinking up new ideas and
being creative is important to her or him. She or he likes to do
things in her/his own original way” (self-direction) and “It is
important to her or him to be rich. She or he wants to have a
lot of money and expensive things” (power). The internal con-
sistencies were acceptable (median a ¼ .59). In other research,
this short version of the PVQ was found to be invariant across
20 European countries, allowing us to compare the relations
between values and political attitudes across countries (Davi-
dov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008; see also Zercher, Schmidt,
Cieciuch, & Davidov, 2015).
Respondents’ political attitudes were measured on scale
ranging from 0 (left wing), 5 (center), to 10 (right wing). We
operationalized left-wing individuals as those who responded
0 or 1; moderates as those who responded 4, 5, or 6; and
right-wing individuals as those who responded 9 or 10.
As stated above, we analyzed data from three additional vari-
ables associated with attitudes. The data set of the European
Social Survey (ESS) is rich and contains various variables.
However, because the main focus of this article is values, we
limited the number of additional variables to three. We selected
attitudes toward immigrants and trust in (inter)national institu-
tions as they are related to politics, whereas the third variable,
well-being, was included for exploratory purposes. Attitudes
toward immigrants were measured with 7 items. Participants
were asked whether various immigrant groups (e.g., immigrants
from poorer European countries) should be allowed to enter
their country and whether immigrants were enriching their
country (a ¼ .90). The items were standardized before being
averaged because lengths of the response scales varied across
items. Trust in (inter)national institutions was measured with
7 items which asked about the amount of trust participants had
in institutions such as the legal system, the police, and the Eur-
opean parliament (a ¼ .90). Answers were given on a scale
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ranging from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust). Well-
being was measured with 6 items which assessed how often
in the past week respondents experienced negative emotions
such as feeling depressed, lonely, or sad (a ¼ .80). Answers
were given on a scale ranging from 1 (none or almost none of
the time) to 4 (all or almost all of the time).
Data Analysis
We computed intraclass correlations (ICC[1]; Bliese, 2000), the
agreement index awg (Brown&Hauenstein, 2005), and standard
deviations (SDs) as relevant measures. The ICC[1] indicates the
proportion of between-group to within-group variance and
ranges from 0 to 1. Thus, the higher the ICC[1], the higher the
proportion of variance is explained by group (i.e., country)
membership. The awg denotes the ratio amount of consensus
on the maximum possible disagreement and ranges from 1
(complete disagreement) to 1 (complete agreement). While the
ICC[1] and awg are independent of the scale length, SDs are not
but can be easily compared with the Levene test. Further, the
ICC[1] measures variance explained by country membership,
the awg and the SD measure variability within groups, both
within and across countries. While our choice of dispersion
measures was guided in terms of practicality and comparability
with previous research (Fischer & Schwartz, 2011), they are all
highly correlated among each other: The SD correlates highly
(|rs| > .94) with the interrater agreement rwg, normed-
coefficient of variation V0, and the awg (Roberson, Sturman, &
Simons, 2007). The R code that allows reproduction of analyses
can be found on the Open Science Framework (OSF; https://osf.
io/nhsp3/?view_only¼fd8f342306774694a5c536d6f118af7b).
Results
Across all 21 countries, 2,264 participants identified them-
selves as left wing (M ¼ 107.81 per country, SD ¼ 58.27),
18,705 as center (M¼ 890.71, SD¼ 278.26), and 2,262 as right
wing (M ¼ 107.71, SD ¼ 88.41).2
ICC[1]
First, we report the results of the ICC(1). As expected, the var-
iance in values explained by country was, with one exception,
below .16 (see Table 1 and Figure 1). As predicted, left- and
right-wing respondents were more heterogeneous across coun-
tries than individuals in the political center. Figure 1 displays
the ICC[1]s for all 10 value types and the three groups (left,
center, and right). As just one example, the ICC[1] of achieve-
ment was smaller for people in the center (.09) than for those on
the extreme left and right (.16 and .15), indicating that
between-country differences explained more variance for left-
and right-wingers than for those with moderate political views.
As noted at the bottom of Table 1, the ICCs for attitudes toward
immigrants, trust in (inter)national institutions, and well-being
were approximately the same for all three groups except
attitudes toward immigrants, which differed across countries
more for left-wingers than the other two groups.
Heterogeneity and Agreement Across Countries
Next, we compared the heterogeneity of all three groups across
all 21 countries. Specifically, we tested whether the values of
left- and right-wingers are more diverse than the values of those
in the center across all European countries, using a series of
Levene tests for variance homogeneity. The results showed that
left-wingers were significantly more heterogeneous than those
in the center for all 10 values (see Table 2),3 supporting the
Table 1. Intraclass Correlation (ICC[1]).
Variables
ICC[1]
Left Center Right
Security .10 .09 .11
Tradition .10 .06 .10
Conformity .10 .05 .03
Benevolence .09 .12 .06
Universalism .08 .08 .03
Self-direction .06 .05 .03
Stimulation .06 .02 .03
Hedonism .12 .09 .15
Achievement .16 .09 .15
Power .21 .11 .09
Immigrants .21 .12 .11
Trust .13 .15 .16
Well-being .05 .05 .05
Mean (values) .11 .08 .08
Note. Immigrants ¼ attitudes toward immigrants; trust ¼ trust in (inter)na-
tional organizations.
Figure 1. Intraclass correlations for all 10 value types across 21
European countries separated by political ideology.
Hanel et al. 877
view that extreme left-wingers form a less homogeneous mass.
Also, right-wingers were significantly more heterogeneous
than those in the center for all values except for conformity.
Left-wingers tended to be more heterogeneous than right-
wingers. For attitudes toward immigrants, trust in (inter)na-
tional institutions, and well-being, the same pattern was
observed. The agreement index awg supported the findings: The
amount of agreement was higher across almost all variables for
the people in the center.
This pattern suggests a quadratic trend: The more extreme
the political attitudes, the larger the heterogeneity. To visualize
this pattern, we plotted the SDs of each of political attitude
groups, separately for all 13 dependent variables. Figure 2
shows a clear quadratic trend for the 13 dependent variables.
A 21 (countries)  143 (11 levels of political ideology  13
dependent variables) matrix with the SDs in each cell can be
found on osf (https://osf.io/nhsp3/?view_only¼fd8f34230
6774694a5c536d6f118af7b).
Heterogeneity Within Countries
In a next step, we investigated whether the findings were con-
sistent within each country. For this, we assessed how often
left- or right-wingers were more homogeneous than those in the
center within each country and variable, using again the SD as a
measure of heterogeneity. This resulted in two sets of 21 (coun-
tries)  13 (dependent variables [DVs]) comparisons. Left-
wingers were more heterogeneous than centrists in 210 of the
273 comparisons (77%). In Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ger-
many, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom left-wingers were more heterogeneous for at least 12 of
the 13 DVs than those in the center. In contrast, in Israel,
Lithuania, Norway, and Spain, left-wingers were only in 6 or
7 of the 13 DVs more heterogeneous. Right-wingers were het-
erogeneous than centrists in 202 of the 273 comparisons (74%).
In Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Poland, right-wingers are
more heterogeneous for at least 12 of the 13 DVs than those
in the center. In contrast, in France, Hungary, Ireland, Lithua-
nia, and Slovenia, right-wingers were in only 6 or 7 of the 13
DVs more heterogeneous.
Table 2. Heterogeneity Across Left-Wingers, Centers, and Right-Wingers.
SD/awg (Left) SD/awg (Center) SD/awg (Right)
Left-Center Left-Right Center-Right
F p F p F p
Security 1.14/.52 0.99/.62 1.03/.59 24.48 <.0001 10.72 <.0001 7.75 <.0001
Tradition 1.11/.59 0.98/.68 1.06/.63 18.73 <.0001 5.00 .0018 8.68 <.0001
Conformity 1.24/.53 1.07/.63 1.12/.57 29.32 <.0001 15.37 <.0001 4.20 .0021
Benevolence 0.85/.66 0.80/.72 0.85/.66 5.63 .0002 2.66 .0467 7.41 <.0001
Universalism 0.78/.71 0.76/.76 0.88/.69 4.72 .0008 8.57 <.0001 21.39 <.0001
Self-direction 1.00/.60 0.93/.66 0.98/.62 4.83 .0007 5.76 .0006 4.93 .0006
Stimulation 1.28/.51 1.18/.56 1.29/.49 7.89 <.0001 1.26 .2872 10.29 <.0001
Hedonism 1.24/.51 1.14/.59 1.27/.53 13.55 <.0001 6.13 .0004 29.01 <.0001
Achievement 1.34/.47 1.20/.56 1.32/.48 18.09 <.0001 2.32 .0732 15.36 <.0001
Power 1.25/.59 1.07/.67 1.16/.61 33.74 <.0001 6.45 .0002 14.01 <.0001
Immigrants 0.99/.75 0.75/.84 0.80/.80 118.02 <.0001 58.32 <.0001 22.46 <.0001
Trust 2.15/.53 1.91/.67 2.24/.54 36.99 <.0001 14.86 <.0001 59.02 <.0001
Well-being 0.57/.60 0.50/.64 0.55/.59 25.39 <.0001 4.58 .0033 17.80 <.0001
Note. Inferential tests were conducted with the standard deviations. df1¼ 1 for all comparisons; df2¼ 20,550–20,573 (left–center comparison), 4,409–4,417 (left–
right comparison), and 20,518–20,542 (center–right comparison); immigrants ¼ attitudes toward immigrants; trust ¼ trust in (inter)national organizations;
SDs ¼ standard deviations (computed across all countries); awg ¼ agreement index (computed separately for each country and then averaged).
Figure 2. Standard deviations for all 10 political attitude groups,
separately for all 13 DVs. SE ¼ security; TR ¼ tradition; CO ¼ con-
formity; BE ¼ benevolence; UN ¼ universalism; SD ¼ self-direction;
ST ¼ stimulation; HE ¼ hedonism; AC ¼ achievement; PO ¼ power;
IMM ¼ attitudes toward immigrants; TRU ¼ trust (inter)national
institutions; WB ¼ well-being. The SD of trust has been decreased by
1 for illustrational purposes.
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Discussion
In the current article, we addressed the issue of value endorse-
ment variability among citizens from 20 European countries
and Israel. The results based on two different analysis (ICCs
and Levene’s tests for differences between SDs) between and
within countries largely supported our hypotheses. Specifi-
cally, we found that more extreme left- and right-wing political
supporters were more heterogeneous compared to those with
more moderate political attitudes. Specifically, we found that
on almost 70% of all value and attitude comparisons, both left-
and right-wingers were more heterogeneous than moderates,
and that these effects were not moderated by a set of
country-level variables. Overall, a higher proportion of var-
iance in value endorsement was explained by country member-
ship among more extreme political supporters compared to
individuals with moderate views.
It is essential to note, however, that cross-country value/atti-
tude variability within groups of political supporters might also
partially stem from within-country variability. Indeed, Fischer
and Schwartz (2011) reported that values vary the most
between individuals rather than countries. This is also reflected
in our findings—left-wing supporters exhibited higher hetero-
geneity more often than moderates in Western European coun-
tries, Estonia, and Finland. The same was true for right-wing
supporters and moderates comparisons in Austria, Germany,
Poland, and Belgium. At the same time, only on half of the
studied variables, left- and right-wing respondents exhibited
higher value/attitude variability than moderates in Lithuania,
Norway, Spain, Israel, France, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania,
and Slovenia. These findings also demonstrate that the pattern
of value/attitude variability within countries cannot be used to
distinguish Western from Eastern European countries or Israel.
It is possible that the integration of European states has contrib-
uted to a change in value endorsement in countries that had
been previously dominated by communist regimes. Hence, the
findings reported by Schwartz and Bardi (1997) on communist
value endorsement (i.e., conservation), which would suggest a
higher homogeneity of conservative values among political
supporters in Eastern Europe, might not be valid anymore.
Finally, we found that the extent of heterogeneity was not
explained by the country-level moderator’s parasite-stress
level, religiosity, and income for any political attitude group.
This replicates Hanel and Vione (2016) who investigated
whether student samples and the general public are more het-
erogeneous in more autonomous and less embedded countries
(cf. Schwartz, 2006). Across 59 countries and 7 attitudinal vari-
ables, they did not find a moderating effect of autonomy or
embeddedness.
Consistency Between Citizens and Politicians
in Value/Attitude Variability
We demonstrated that the heterogeneity of value endorsement
among more extreme political supporters, rather than simply
activists, can be partly explained by country membership.
Therefore, country membership might have been a reason for
value heterogeneity among left- and right-wing politicians in
van Hiel’s (2012) study. We observed the same pattern of
results in our study by taking into account 20 European coun-
tries and Israel and studying value differences within and
across these countries. In this way, we could test for heteroge-
neity of values among general population. Therefore, the
observed heterogeneity of values in our study was less likely
influenced by group and conformity processes (Mason,
2006). Importantly, by using inferential statistics, we showed
that within European countries, the heterogeneity between left-
and right-wing supporters is equal.
Also, Duriez et al. (2005) provided partial evidence that
there are between-country differences in personality traits
related to values among left- and right-wing supporters and
activists across Western and Eastern European countries. Our
findings were corroborated by large heterogeneities for the
political extremists across all 21 countries for attitudes toward
immigrants, trust in (inter)national organizations, and well-
being. This contrasts with recent findings in the United States
based on the data from political supporters (Ondish & Stern,
2017), suggesting that moderates are more heterogeneous in
their political attitudes locally (i.e., within their own countries)
and also at a supranational level (across countries). Overall,
integrating our findings with the previous literature (Duriez
et al., 2005; van Hiel, 2012), it seems that political supporters
and political activists exhibit similar patterns of value
heterogeneity.
It is also worth noting that the larger heterogeneity among
European conservatives might be due to historic reasons: Eur-
opean conservatism is more strongly tied to old feudalistic
structures such as landed aristocracies or churches (Hartz,
1955; Schultze, Sturm, & Eberle, 2003; Viereck, 1956). As the
nature of such structures varied across European states, those
who still believe in them, that is, mainly conservatives or
right-wing supporters, would be therefore more diverse than
those who entirely reject feudalistic structures, such as moder-
ates or left-wing supporters. However, this post hoc reasoning
is somewhat speculative, as it would need to be directly tested
in a cross-cultural comparison.
However, our somewhat surprising finding that right-wing
supporters are also more heterogeneous regarding their
attitudes toward immigrants seemingly contradicts literature,
suggesting that more extreme right-wing politicians share
anti-immigration and related anti-EU integration views (see
Cherepnalkoski, Karpf, Mozetic, & Grear, 2016). It is believed
that anti-immigration attitudes appear to be a strong unifying
factor across right-wing parties, especially in the recent years
(see also Ivarsflaten, 2007, for empirical support), as the popu-
larity of such parties across many European countries has
increased significantly (e.g., in Austria, France, Greece, Den-
mark, Finland, Hungary; Adler, 2016). Thus, our findings
could hint to some potential differences among party members
and citizens who endorse the right-wing ideology. A further
possibility is that the two groups had different immigrant
groups in mind: Many decisions in the European Parliament
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concern non-EU immigrants, whereas participants in our sam-
ple might have thought mainly about EU immigrants (recall
that the data used in the present study were collected in 2014
and 2015, presumably before many refugees from Syria and
Afghanistan were looking for shelter in the EU). We also need
to acknowledge that the political ideology item consisted of a
single item. Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov (2011) claimed that
the single dimension of left–right might not fully capture peo-
ple’s political attitudes. It is also possible that people may have
different understanding of the left–right spectrum depending on
the historical and socioeconomic context of their countries of
origin (Duriez et al., 2005). However, it is worth noting that
previous between-country research relying on ESS data found
meaningful differences between those participants who identi-
fied themselves as belonging to the political left and right wing
(Aspelund, Lindeman, & Verkasalo, 2013; Ivarsflaten, 2007;
Rydgren, 2008). We should note that we also found the
expected mean differences. For example, left-wingers across
all 21 countries valued conformity, tradition, and security less
than right-wingers, replicating Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna,
Vecchione, and Barbaranelli (2006).
Variability in Conservation, Self-Transcendence,
and Self-Enhancement Values
Overall, the variance explained by country membership in
value variability was less than 10%. Such findings are in line
with Fischer and Schwartz (2011), indicating that values differ
the most between individuals rather than between-country
members in general. In Fischer and Schwartz’s research, the
only value type that was influenced by country membership
was conformity. Our results extend such findings by indicating
that country membership is indeed an important determinant of
conformity and tradition differences, but mainly in the case of
left- and right-wing political supporters. The same pattern was
true for tradition. To summarize, we show that although coun-
try membership might not account for large differences in
value importance among European citizens, it plays a signifi-
cant role in value variability within the political context.
In turn, we found the highest homogeneity among extre-
mists for benevolence and universalism values, which are coin-
cidentally the most important value types for people in general
(see Barnea & Schwartz, 1998). These values can be also seen
as essential for successful cooperation between people and
across groups, as they refer to tolerance and welfare of others.
In contrast, agreement for achievement (i.e., intellectual auton-
omy or independence) is relatively low. This might be because
achievement values might be understood (i.e., instantiated) dif-
ferently than benevolence. Some people might think about
achievement as receiving good grades or earning large sums
of money and dismiss it therefore more readily because it might
be against their universalism values. In contrast, if people
understand it more as achieving a good work life balance than
some people might find it more important (Hanel et al., 2018).
The relatively lower homogeneity in terms of benevolence
and universalism might be also a methodological artifact, as
we obtained ceiling effects for these values. However, future
experiments can build upon such findings by highlighting that
not only are benevolence and universalism some of the most
important values on average, but that this view is also shared
by many people within political groups across European coun-
tries and Israel. At the same time, people often underestimate
how important benevolence and universalism are for other peo-
ple (Hanel et al., 2018). This is relevant because people who
believe that others have higher self-transcendence values are
also more inclined to do civic engagement (Sanderson et al.,
2018). Previous research that has tried to change the perception
of others’ self-transcendence values by presenting absolute per-
centage of people endorsing those values, has failed to high-
light the relative homogeneity of these values (Hanel et al.,
2018), which possibly resulted in subtyping (Richards & Hew-
stone, 2001). Overall, it appears that all political supporters
across EU and Israel are relatively homogenous in endorsing
benevolence and universalism values. Despite large cross-
country heterogeneity in other values, it seems that in general
self-transcendence values make it possible for various political
groups to form political groups at supranational level in Eur-
opean Parliament.
Finally, we would like to acknowledge that the European
Social Survey data did not allow us to include all EU
nations in our analyses. Therefore, the heterogeneity of the
values found in the present research might have been
impacted. Future research should further investigate these
issues. Also, for the purposes of generality, it would be
worthwhile to be able to assess value heterogeneity using
a sample of members of the European Parliament to assess
whether their pattern of responses converges with our ESS
findings.
Conclusion
To conclude, we demonstrate that European country member-
ship is a relevant factor in explaining value heterogeneity, espe-
cially in the case of more extreme political supporters in
comparison to moderate ones. Such differences were most pro-
nounced in the case of tradition and conformity values and the
least pronounced in the case of self-transcendence values and
were not moderated by country-level variables. Overall, our
findings suggest that speaking of “extreme left-wing values”
or “extreme right-wing values” may not be meaningful, as
members of both groups are heterogeneous in the values that
they endorse.
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Notes
1. We also examined whether people are more homogeneous if they
live in a country with more pressure to behave alike (i.e., in coun-
tries with lower incomes, higher religiosity, and higher parasite
stress level). A rationale for this moderator analysis and findings
can be found in the Online Supplemental Material. To summarize,
country-level moderators did not correlate with the variability in
any of the three groups.
2. The pattern of results remained across all analyses the same when
only extreme left-wingers (i.e., those who chose 0 on the 0–10
political attitude scale, n¼ 1,144), “extreme” center (5 on the polit-
ical attitude scale, n¼ 10,294), and extreme right-wingers (10, n¼
961) were included.
3. Because we have conducted 39 Levene tests (see Table 2), we set
our significance level to a ¼ .002. The use of multiple correction
methods is usually arbitrary, with the number of tests being to con-
trol for being the most difficult number to determine. Our adjusted
significance level was set in a way that it is neither extremely con-
servative nor liberal (in our view). We report the exact p values of
up to four decimal places to allow the readers to use different
thresholds.
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